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1 A Left-Handed Blow: Writing 
the History of  Animals
Erica Fudge
In 1940, Walter Benjamin wrote that “every image of  the past that is not recog-
nized by the present as one of  its own concerns threatens to disappear irretriev-
ably” (“Theses,” 247). The implications of  Benjamin’s statement are twofold.
First, there are elements of  the past that are deemed unworthy of  entry into
conventional history, and it is the obligation of  the radical historian to ensure a
place for these elements. Second, if  that past is allowed to disappear it will take
with it a knowledge of  the present, because the two are inseparable. In fact, his-
tory is where both the past and the present must be brought together, and the
historian has a duty to both.
Benjamin is not alone in his sense of  the importance of  the work of  the his-
torian. Just a brief  look at the opening statements of  two of  the most important
journals within the discipline underline this fact. In February 1952, the original
editors of  Past and Present wrote, “[H]istory cannot logically separate the past
from the present and the future,” and they quoted Polybius’s idea that the study
of history allows us “to face coming events with con¤dence” (iii). Again, the
distinction of  then and now, past and present, is refused, and history is ¤gured
as a project not merely of  recollection, but also of  future planning.
From a very different perspective, the founding editorial collective of  History
Workshop: A Journal of Socialist Historians (now called History Workshop Jour-
nal) argued, “We believe that history is a source of  inspiration and under-
standing, furnishing not only the means of  interpreting the past but also the
best critical vantage point from which to view the present” (2). And in a follow-
ing editorial on “Feminist History,” Sally Alexander and Anna Davin made the
case for the “use” of  history—its role as a project of  the past, but for the future.
“Sexual divisions are being questioned now because of  the women’s liberation
movement, and it is through investigating the problems which feminism has
raised that we can expect the most useful women’s history to emerge” (4–5). All
three perspectives—Benjamin’s, Past and Present’s, and History Workshop’s—
emphasize the role that history can—and should—play in contemporary cul-
ture.
A history of  animals would seem to be an obvious place where yet again the
ethical nature of  the historian’s work should be clear. Just as Alexander and
Davin emphasize the formative role of  the women’s liberation movement in the
work of  women’s history, so it is impossible not to link the recent emergence of
histories of  animals to the growing centrality of  debates about animal rights
and welfare. Some histories, for example Richard Ryder’s Animal Revolution:
Changing Attitudes towards Speciesism, have been written that are directly a part
of  the project of  animal liberation. In this book Ryder, conventionally, claims a
use for his work: “[S]pecies alone,” he writes in his introduction, “is not a valid
criterion for cruel discrimination” (6), and as the rest of  his work shows, “the
motives for speciesist exploitation are multiple. . . . [A]ll are culturally shaped”
(333). The book’s aim is to explore the ways in which culture shapes our current
attitudes, with the intention of  changing them. But other histories of  animals
are also emerging that seem to be less directly linked to what might conveniently
be called “activism,” and it is these works that I am interested in here. What is
the ethical work performed by a history of  animals that might appear on the
surface to be just another aspect of  human history? This essay is an attempt to
trace an answer to this question by exploring some of the historiographical is-
sues thrown up by the entry of  animals into the arena of  history, and it is an
attempt to outline how future work might re®ect current ethical concerns.
As I began this work, one of  the things that immediately struck me was the
fact that very little has been written about the historiographical issues raised in
writing about animals, and that, in fact, one of  the most extended discussions
of this topic is probably a joke. The article to which I refer comes from 1974 and
is about the need for a history of  pets. Published in the Journal of Social History,
Charles Phineas’s “Household Pets and Urban Alienation” is a parody of  that
rising star of  the historical ¤rmament—social history.1 It is worth quoting at
length to give a sense of  its argument:
It seems brash to suggest that pets become the next ‘fad’ subject in social history,
but, after running through various ethnic groups (and now women) historians may
need a new toy. There are other promising possibilities. Homosexuals deserve a his-
tory, but a movement in this direction has not materialized, perhaps because homo-
sexuals lack political muscle, perhaps because of  more personal tensions among
historians. Left-handers, another large group long subject to intense social discrimi-
nation, merit attention, but again their collective consciousness has lagged. So why
not pets? Here, clearly, would be the ultimate history of  the inarticulate. Written
records, where available, would lend themselves more to anal than to oral history,
and a new ¤eld could open up. Yet it may not come to pass. Without political
power or claims, pets will hardly attract the interest of  radical social historians.
And at the other pole of  academe, university administrators will be under no pres-
sure to add courses on the history of  pets, until such time at least as obedience
schools are merged with standard undergraduate fare. (339)
The article notes developments within the discipline of  history—the emergence
of histories of  previously unnoticed groups—and takes them to their logical ter-
minus, the history of  the most unnoticed of  all: animals.
At its heart, the article is a parody of  the kind of  social, Marxist history that
can be traced in the work of  a historian such as E. P. Thompson. The pet is
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placed within the discourse of  social history, and its existence within urban cul-
ture is given the Marxist spin. Phineas writes, “While granting that escape and
particularly the formation of  collective protest, as in roving bands of  wild dogs,
were not common occurrences, it is here that the history of  pets should be pur-
sued” (340). This statement is surely a parody of  Thompson’s documentation
of the lives of  the workers in The Making of the English Working Class. In fact,
Phineas is apparently using the kind of  social history epitomized in that book
to rescue pets from what Thompson infamously termed “the enormous conde-
scension of  posterity” (12). “Every gesture of  deference,” writes Phineas, “every
sign of  affection among pets was matched by barely-veiled contempt, beginning
with resistance to housebreaking” (343). As with Thompson’s worker, whose re-
bellions were sometimes, as he notes, “backward-looking” (12), so the pet could
only rebel through a return to the most basic of  actions.
Phineas’s article, then, is an attack on social history, but it is also strangely
prophetic in its recognition of  possible developments within the discipline: the
history of  homosexuality is currently being debated; and, of  course, the history
of animals is now emerging.2 One of  the arguments of  this paper is that the
history of  animals is not merely a “fad” in the ever widening reach of  historical
scholarship. Rather, it is a development of  existing debates in the discipline as
well as in the wider world of  human relationships with nature. More than this,
I want to argue that the history of  animals is a necessary part of  our reconcep-
tualization of  ourselves as human.
I
There are problems, however, with the idea of  a history of  animals, and
it is worth dwelling on them brie®y, before moving on to think about their im-
plications for the development of  this area of  research. Phineas, albeit ironically,
pointed out one of  the fundamental issues that faces historians: animals are “in-
articulate”; they do not leave documents. Gwyn Prins has noted the traditional
belief  that “until there are documents, there can be no proper history” (114). It
is from the written word that our knowledge of  the past comes. Prins, an oral
historian, has reason to question this idea and argues that spoken texts continue
to be more central than written ones in political as well as popular culture. How-
ever, the historian of  animals has no such argument available to her: a dog can
bark, and that bark can be recorded, documented, but it cannot be understood.
The only documents available to the historian in any ¤eld are documents writ-
ten, or spoken, by humans.
Another problem for the history of  animals emerges in the ways in which we
organize the past in our histories. This is a problem which exacerbates one that
is recognized in other ¤elds of  history. In 1977, Joan Kelly famously asked the
question “Did Women Have a Renaissance?” She answered it by arguing that
the term being used to epitomize a historical period actually represented what
happened to only a tiny minority of  literate men; that it immediately evacuated
from the interest of  the historian those who were not involved in the intellectual
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debates—women, the poor, the illiterate. Likewise, in histories of  the non-Euro-
pean, a similar question of  periodization emerges: L. C. Van Leur, a historian of
Indonesia, wondered whether the categories which organize European history—
such as “the eighteenth century”—were useful. As Henk Wesseling notes, Van
Leur “concludes that there was no point in this since none of  the great changes
that typify European history of  this period can be traced in the Indonesian past”
(74). Animals, as far as we know (and this is the only perspective available to
us) have no sense of  periodization. So, given the question “did dogs have a Ren-
aissance?” the answer is clearly no; dogs did not partake of  the intellectual de-
bates which de¤ne the period, nor did they have the concept of  historical peri-
odization so central to our understanding of  the past. If  we are to write the
history of  animals, a wholly different organizing structure would seem to be
necessary.
When we take just these two points—the lack of  documents and the need for
new temporal organization in a history of  animals—the whole project becomes
rather dif¤cult, not to say impossible. We are attempting to write histories with-
out some of the fundamental ingredients for history. But, as someone with an
investment in the history of  animals, I do not, of  course, wish to declare the
project to be futile. The problems I am raising—which, I recognize, sound like
they could have been raised by Charles Phineas—are problems which, like the
joke article, force us to rethink some of the things that we have perhaps taken
for granted. So we must ask another question: is there really an emerging ¤eld
of work which can be called the history of  animals? My answer to this question
is both yes and no. The emerging ¤eld—containing much absolutely fascinating
and rewarding work—is clearly there, but it is not the history of  animals; such
a thing is impossible. Rather, it is the history of  human attitudes toward ani-
mals. I continue to use the term “history of  animals” as if  it were, as Derrida
has proposed, sur rature—under erasure: it is both indispensable and impossible.
It sums up an area of  study, but cannot de¤ne it.
But, if  this history of  animals is in reality the history of  human attitudes
toward animals, we are, perhaps, dealing with something that is merely a part
of  the history of  ideas: nothing really new at all. If  our only access to animals
in the past is through documents written by humans, then we are never look-
ing at the animals, only ever at the representation of  the animals by humans.
The difference is an important one, and in a sense epitomizes one of  the most
signi¤cant debates currently taking place within the discipline of  history itself,
between (broadly speaking) empiricism and poststructuralism—that is, be-
tween a belief  that the past is recoverable to history through an objective analy-
sis of  its documents, and a belief  that history is constructed (not always-already
there for the taking), and that the documents of  the past are always-already only
representations. The difference between these interpretations affects how histo-
rians can know, can understand the past.
So acknowledging the centrality of  representation that emerges in the history
of animals places it ¤rmly within what I am terming the poststructuralist camp,
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and this makes a huge difference to the project. It means, in the ¤rst instance,
that documents come into being; we read humans writing about animals. Repre-
sentation is always-already inevitable. But it also, and more signi¤cantly, means
that the real animal can disappear. That is, the emphasis on the material might
be abandoned in favor of  the purely textual. Roy Porter has argued that this is
a particular problem when dealing with the history of  a corporeal substance like
the body (208), but it is also fundamentally problematic, I think, when dealing
with the history of  animals. This issue lies at the heart of  Coral Lansbury’s The
Old Brown Dog.
In her study of  the Edwardian case of  the twice-vivisected “Brown Dog,”
Lansbury charts the different social groups which became involved in the anti-
vivisection movement of  the time and offers contextual readings of  their mo-
tivations. The animal, she argues, was understood in this moment merely as a
representation of  the (human) self. The women protestors saw their sense of
degradation in medical treatment and in pornographic writings echoed in the
¤gure of  the vivisected animal; the poor interpreted the use of  the dog on the
laboratory table as replicating the ways in which some hospitals, under the guise
of  treatment, used low-status humans for experimentation. These perceived
links between animals and humans, however, bring with them dangers. Lans-
bury notes, “The cause of  animals was not helped when they were seen as sur-
rogates for women, or workers. . . . If  we look at animals and see only the re®ec-
tion of  ourselves, we deny them the reality of  their own existence. Then it
becomes possible to forget their plight” (188). By reading the animal as a repre-
sentation—by managing to displace the central reality of  the treatment of  the
dog—these rioters, Lansbury argues, were not necessarily furthering ideas about
animal welfare. Rather, they were using the opportunity to think about their
own degraded places in society. The dog is a representation of  the human; it is
not, paradoxically, a dog.
Lansbury’s history, however, is about this repression of  the real animal, and
rightly points in a different direction. Animals are present in most Western cul-
tures for practical use,3 and it is in use—in the material relation with the animal
—that representations must be grounded. Concentration on pure representation
(if  such a thing were possible) would miss this, and it is the job—perhaps even
the duty—of the historian of  animals to understand and analyze the uses to
which animals were put. If  we ignore the very real impact of  human dominion—
whether in meat-eating, sport, work, or any other form—we are ignoring the
fundamental role animals have played in the past. A symbolic animal is only a
symbol (and therefore to be understood within the study of  iconography, poet-
ics) unless it is related to the real. One way of  thinking about why an idealist,
purely representational history of  animals is a problem is by thinking about the
intention of  the project: the reason for recovering the history of  the animal. In
order to do this, a brief  outline of  some current developments in the ¤eld might
help to trace some of the interests which histories of  animals are currently serv-
ing. I should state clearly here that I am not looking at the kind of  work that is
A Left-Handed Blow 7
going on in the ¤elds of  environmental and evolutionary history, but am con-
centrating on work that relies upon textual sources that can be broadly termed
social and cultural history.
II
Recent histories of  animals seem to take up, broadly speaking, one of
three possible positions: these I am terming intellectual history, humane history,
and holistic history. The ¤rst of  these positions can be traced in two recent col-
lections on animals in the Middle Ages: Joyce E. Salisbury’s The Medieval World
of Nature and Nona C. Flores’s Animals in the Middle Ages. Both offer new ways
of reading canonical works of  the period, and what is at stake is the deeper un-
derstanding of  an intellectual debate. Flores writes that the essays in her collec-
tion “show how animals were used to convey meaning—whether religious or
profane—in medieval culture” (xi). What de¤nes these books as “intellectual”
rather than humane or holistic can be clearly traced in Salisbury’s introductory
claim that the essays in her collection “look at one element of  nature but yield
much larger truths that reveal the medieval mind” (xii). It is this “medieval
mind” that is the main object of  analysis, and because of  this, these histories
seem to reproduce the ideas of  the period they are recording. They do not nec-
essarily question them, because what is at stake is an assessment of  an intellec-
tual position.4 Another book that would ¤t into the category of  intellectual his-
tory is Keith Thomas’s Man and the Natural World. Its right to be included here
is explicit in its subtitle in the English edition: Changing Attitudes in England,
1500–1800. Attitudes, not animals, are the focus.
In the second type of  history—humane history—we move away from the in-
tellectual realm into an assessment of  the lived relation. It is the materiality of
the animal that is important here. A good example of  this type of  history is
Robert Malcolmson and Stephanos Mastoris’s The English Pig.5 The authors
state their claim for the project clearly:
All human communities have involved animals. While, in a sense, we all know this,
and might regard such a statement as self-evident, the history that we read tends
not to pay much attention to species other than our own. History, being written by
humans, is mostly about humans; and we may sometimes forget how prevalent—
indeed, very visibly prevalent—animals were in most earlier societies. (29)
A rather simplistic paraphrase might be: it is worth writing about animals be-
cause animals lived in close contact with humans, and we can learn new things
about the humans if  we look at the animals. This concentration on the human
is something that the authors explicitly acknowledge: “[T]his book,” they write,
“is mostly about people, for pigs have enjoyed little of  what can be called an
independent existence” (31). That is, humane history looks at the animals as
they are depicted in documents that are always written by humans, and which
therefore reveal something of  the human.
An apparently very different study that can also be placed in the same ¤eld
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of humane history is Hilda Kean’s Animal Rights. Here Kean traces the ways in
which sympathy for animals led to the organization of  animal welfare move-
ments and charities in nineteenth- and twentieth-century British culture. Like
Malcolmson and Mastoris, Kean uses the human relation with the animal as a
way of  looking at broader social (that is, human) ideas. It is not accidental that
the subtitle of  the book is Political and Social Change in Britain since 1800, as
one of  the central issues here is the growth of  popular politics. Kean notes that
campaigns such as those against vivisection re®ected the “growing in®uence of
women and the working class in political and cultural life” (157). The book is as
much a study of  the signi¤cance and power of  popular protest, traced through
an analysis of  attitudes toward cruelty to animals, as it is about the animals
themselves.
Both Malcolmson and Mastoris’s and Kean’s books are, then, important stud-
ies of  forgotten aspects of  social history, and it is through the animal that these
are traced. In fact, this is the acknowledged reason for the work. As Kean writes,
“When humanitarians rescued stray animals, or deplored the treatment of  cattle
driven to slaughter, or erected water troughs for thirsty animals, it tells us more
about the political and cultural concerns of  society at that time than about the
plight of  animals per se” (11). The recognition that a new understanding of hu-
man life can be traced in animals links Malcolmson and Mastoris’s and Kean’s
work with the intellectual histories, but their concentration on the social, the
economic, and the political is also the point of  difference. Rather than merely
tools for the intellect, animals are the site of  social change. However, this dif-
ference between intellectual and humane history is, in its turn, the thing that
links humane history with the third of  my categories: holistic history. I am not
saying that there is a clear and absolute division between the categories I am
setting up. Rather, I am arguing that they represent different trends within what
remains a single body of  work that I am terming the history of  animals. Ulti-
mately, however, the third of  my categories—holistic history—is where I believe
an interpretation that can work toward ethical change can be found.
The two outstanding contributions to what I am terming holistic history are
Harriet Ritvo’s The Animal Estate and Kathleen Kete’s The Beast in the Boudoir.
In both of  these books the representation of  the animal is offered as a way of
rethinking cultures which have, apparently, been thoroughly ransacked for
meaning by historians, and in both cases—as in Malcolmson and Mastoris’s and
Kean’s work—what emerges is a very new picture of  the past.
Both Ritvo and Kete make clear the case for their work. Ritvo says that an
examination of  animals “illuminate[s] the history not only of  the relations be-
tween people and other species, but also of  relations among human groups” (4).
And in a similar vein Kete states, “When bourgeois people spoke of  their pets,
as they loquaciously did, they pointedly spoke also of  their times, and above all
else of  themselves” (2). On one level it could be argued that what Ritvo and Kete
have done is recognize that animals can tell us about humans; this is the humane
historian’s line. But both go further than this, and what is at stake here is the
status of  the human itself. The idea that meaning can only be made through
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difference—which emerges in Saussure’s linguistic theory—leads to the inevi-
table conclusion that the human is only ever meaningful when understood in
relation to the not-human. This is a particularly useful conceptualization, in
that we learn more about humans by understanding what they claimed that they
were not: animals.
In The Animal Estate Ritvo concentrates on “rhetorical” strategies; that is, on
the ways in which discourse “restructur[es] and recreat[es] . . . reality” (5). It is
here that the animal is at its most potent, and, paradoxically, its most materially
weak. “Animals,” she writes, “were uniquely suitable subjects for a rhetoric that
both celebrated human power and extended its sway, especially because they
concealed this theme at the same time that they expressed it” (6). Again, a look
at the subtitle of  Ritvo’s work offers a clue to its contents: it is The English and
Other Creatures in the Victorian Age, and here the reliance of  human upon ani-
mal for its meaning ¤nds its logical end: human (Ritvo uses the word “English”
as a synonym to underline the imperialist belief  in the lesser humanity of  the
non-English) relies on not-human for its meaning, and this reliance creates a
sense of  a loss of  status. The human is just one among “other creatures.”
For Kathleen Kete, petkeeping offers a crucial way into understanding what
she terms “mediocre lives” (1). And it is through an analysis of  petkeeping that
she recognizes that the human relationship with the animal “describes the fault
lines of  individualism” (2). Her analysis of  the literature surrounding petkeep-
ing—training manuals, newspapers, lectures, pamphlets—offers a new perspec-
tive on human relationships in terms of  class and gender, but it also outlines the
ways in which nineteenth-century Parisian life represented a clash of  ideologies,
of  ancien régime and modernity. The terrors of  the new culture were being offset
by the bourgeois ownership of  animals, creatures who came to represent every-
thing that had been lost—cleanliness, order, and rationality. But inscribed in the
pet’s function is something deeper: it gives access to what Kete terms “the ruins
of  Enlightenment thought” (138). Her study, in this sense, ful¤lls, as does
Ritvo’s, the purpose of  the three classes of  the history of  animals that I have
outlined: the intellectual assumptions and social and political ideas are repre-
sented, but, as well as these two elements, Kete reveals the centrality of  the ani-
mal in human understanding of  the self, or perhaps I should say the centrality
of the animal in the ways in which humans shore up their fragile status.
In holistic history, then, what emerges is the sense that “human” is a category
only meaningful in difference; that the innate qualities that are often claimed
to de¤ne the human—thought, speech, the right to possess private property;
what I have called in Perceiving Animals qualities of  human-ness—are actually
only conceivable through animals; that is, they rely on animals for their mean-
ing. The movement from material to rhetorical, from real to discursive animal,
that can be traced in Ritvo’s and Kete’s works is an inevitable response to some
of the problems with the history of  animals which I have outlined above, and
Ritvo and Kete show brilliantly how turning from the material to the rhetorical
need not undercut what I see as the ethical impetus of  the history of  animals.
What the move reveals, in fact, is the way in which use cannot be separated from
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meaning, and what we see is humans undoing their own status even as they
claim they are strengthening it. This is where, I think, the power of  the history
of animals really lies. Recognizing the centrality of  the animal in our own un-
derstanding of  ourselves as human forces us to reassess the place of  the human.
If  we identify the human as neither a given nor a transcendent truth, then in-
tellectual attitudes that leave unquestioned the result of  these assumptions—
dominion—must themselves be reviewed as not true, but created. Material and
rhetorical are linked in their context, and the history that recognizes this can,
in turn, force a reassessment of  the material through its analysis of  the rhetorical
strategies of  the written record. The inevitable centrality of  the human in the
history of  animals—the reliance upon documents created by humans—need not
be regarded as a failing, because if  a history of  animals is to be distinctive it
must offer us what we might call an “interspecies competence”;6 that is, a new
way of  thinking about and living with animals. Holistic history, in its redrawing
of the human, offers us a way of  achieving this.
Recognizing the continuing centrality of  humans in the history of  animals
has two consequences that can upset the wider anthropocentric attitudes. The
¤rst is a reexamination of  the past and a reassessment of  the ways in which
humans have perceived and treated animals. The second emerges out of  the
¤rst, and is a new assessment of  our own status as “humans.”
III
In Thesis VII of  his “Theses on the Philosophy of  History” Walter Ben-
jamin writes,
There is no document of  civilization which is not at the same time a document of
barbarism. And just as such a document is not free of  barbarism, barbarism taints
also the manner in which it was transmitted from one owner to another. A histori-
cal materialist therefore dissociates himself  from it as far as possible. He regards it
as his task to brush history against the grain. (248)
Benjamin is writing here of  human society, but his ideas about taintedness,
about the fact that nothing which is used to maintain power is innocent, how-
ever it is presented, are also useful in thinking about the ways in which we live
with animals now and in the past. Where Benjamin writes of  barbarity, I write
of anthropocentrism.
Benjamin noted the transmission of  the barbarity of  the documents claimed
by the victors. Even when the barbarity is counteracted, is protested against, it
is still barbarism that rules the day; it is still barbarity that is being expressed.
In a recent article M. B. McMullan tells a tale that exempli¤es the ways in which
the problem of the transmission of  barbarity which Benjamin has highlighted
might be useful for the history of  animals. Following a campaign by the Society
for the Prevention of  Cruelty to Animals (SPCA) and other reformist groups,
and based partly on the fear of  the spread of  rabies, as well as on the sense of
the dogs’ physiological unsuitability for the work, in 1839 a new law—section
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39 of  the Metropolitan Police Act—prohibited the use of  dogs to pull carts in
London. This act would appear to be based upon humanitarian arguments, but
the immediate outcome was far from emancipatory: most of  the dogs were
killed by their owners because they were too expensive to keep as pets. As
McMullan notes, “The measure, purporting to be for their bene¤t, resulted in
their slaughter” (39).
Benjamin argues that the barbarity of  the document cannot be eradicated by
later interpretations, that these are a mere continuation of  barbarity under an-
other name. In the case of  the dog carts of  nineteenth-century London, the pro-
hibition appears to be a document of  humane treatment, a recoiling from the
cruelty of  dominion which had itself  been documented by the carts. On closer
inspection the act is, however, a continuation of  barbarity under a new guise.
As Hilda Kean notes, at the heart of  nineteenth-century animal welfare cam-
paigns is the middle-class desire not to be able to see cruelty. Frances Maria
Thompson, a patron of  the Animal Friends’ Society, wrote in the 1830s, “The
increasing instances of  cruelty in our streets have now risen to such a height
that it is impossible to go any distance from home without encountering some-
thing to wound our feelings” (Kean 60). It is the wound she feels that is of  pri-
mary importance; the animal often appears to be of  only secondary concern,
but the result is an increase in anti-cruelty legislation. This is the anthropocen-
trism that lay beneath the protests against the dog carts. The barbarity was not
halted; it was, as Benjamin recognizes, transmitted from generation to genera-
tion. What would appear to be a challenge is really only a continuation: the
terms of  engagement have not changed, and anthropocentrism is countered
with further anthropocentrism.7
Terry Eagleton has written that “[a]ny attempt to recuperate the past directly,
non-violently, will result only in paralysing complicity with it” (44). I want to
argue that to begin to write about anthropocentrism, to note its transmission,
is perhaps to begin to dissociate oneself  from it, to read it “against the grain.”
It is a refusal of  one of  anthropocentrism’s strengths—its apparent naturalness.
But if  we merely recognize that the way in which we understand and inhabit
our world remains anthropocentric, we are only part of  the way there. The next
crucial step, Benjamin argues in his “Theses on the Philosophy of  History,”
is to recognize that our “amazement [that we ‘still’ do such things] is not the
beginning of  knowledge—unless it is the knowledge that the view of history
which gives rise to it is untenable” (249). A history of  progress—one which sees
an increase in animal welfare in modernity, one which ¤nds the increase in the
number of  vegetarians enough to mean the crucial economic centrality of  the
battery farm can be set aside—fails to see that progress is merely a term which
disguises change, a disguise that will always leave us amazed at our own cruelty.
By implication, the history of  animals cannot merely re®ect upon past cruelties,
lay them bare for examination with the assumption that such laying bare is itself
a political gesture. Actually, in Benjamin’s terms, this merely shifts barbarism;
it does not counter it. So an alternative must be sought, and it is here that the
second possibility of  the history of  animals comes into its own and offers, I
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think, a reinterpretation that does undercut some of the assumptions that allow
anthropocentrism to continue. If  we recognize that progress might actually be
founded upon something far from progressive, then we—humans—are forced
to think again about our relation with animals. If  the rise in charitable institu-
tions, “fellow-feeling,” welfare organizations is premised upon attitudes that are
not necessarily without the taint of  barbarism, then something very new is
needed if  we do want to work toward a more equitable relation with animals.
IV
In 1957, in an implicit reference to Marx’s original, E. P. Thompson
wrote, “Men make their own history. They are part agent, part victim: it is pre-
cisely this element of  agency which distinguishes them from the beasts, which
is the human part of  man” (qtd. in Poster 4).8 Mark Poster notes that Thomp-
son’s statement would be contested by few historians, “liberal, conservative, or
Marxist” (4). Its assumption of  a stable subject who makes his/her own mean-
ing transcends many other divisions within the discipline. This humanism, this
belief  that humans have the power to make their own history, is in Thompson’s
case an attempt to reclaim power for those who may be perceived to lack it—
workers, the poor, the forgotten—but it relied, of  course, on animals to make
its point.
Thompson was one of  the early advocates for and practitioners of  history
from below, and more recent discussions of  its possibilities have not abandoned
the humanist overtones of  the early work. Jim Sharpe, for example, argued in
1992 that history from below allows us to see “that our identity has not been
formed purely by monarchs, prime ministers and generals” (37). Again, identity
is something over which even the most powerless have power. This humanist
idea, as Poster has shown, implies that there is a ¤xed and stable subject—one
the same in the past and the present—and that it is merely the context in which
this subject ¤nds him/herself  that alters his/her being. Humans are born free,
you might say, but everywhere they are in chains.
In this interpretation history from below is the history of  how humans have
been chained, and how they have challenged their con¤nement. And the writing
of history itself  becomes one of  the greatest challenges: it is where the silencing
of the marginal is ended, where “the condescension of  posterity” is undone. The
recovery of  the lives of  those regarded as unimportant and insigni¤cant by tra-
ditional history not only gives a broader view of society, it also allows the his-
torian to reclaim, in the name of the people, a signi¤cant part of  the ideological
apparatus: history itself. But this history remains humanist in a very obvious
and simple way: in response to Francis Fukayama’s declaration of  the end of
history, most historians, Poster argues, would state that, in fact, “history is a real
sequence of  events that will end only with the last gasp of  the last human being.
History and humanity are coterminous” (59). Without our ability to create our
own history, Thompson argued, we are not fully human, and without humanity
there can be no history.
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This idea of  the stability of  the human subject has, of  course, come under
threat in the work of  Michel Foucault. What is lost in Foucault’s work is the
sense of  self  as an autonomous being. Instead of  the transcendent, stable,
Cartesian subject there is a self  formed only in discourse, under the strategies
of power. This decentering of  the subject is clearly related to the work of  the
history of  animals, but one issue separates the two. Foucault and many of  his
followers do not go beyond the human. Strategies of  othering are examined, but
only in terms of  othering humans; the animal is a powerful rhetorical category
into which some humans—the mad, the criminal—are placed. Real animals are
not the issue. A good example of  this can be found in Stephen Greenblatt’s new
historicist analysis of  The Tempest. Greenblatt writes, “Language is, after all, one
of the crucial ways of  distinguishing between men and beasts. . . . Not surpris-
ingly, then, there was some early speculation [by colonialists] that the Indians
were subhuman, and thus, among other things, incapable of  receiving the true
faith” (23). The opposition “men and beasts” slides into the opposition of  hu-
man and subhuman, and the animal disappears from view.
In the history of  animals, however, to question the anthropocentric view of
the world—to brush history against the grain—is to challenge the status of  the
human, which in turn is to throw all sorts of  assumptions into question. If  we
can no longer assume our own status then we can no longer take the status of
animals as a given. What was assumed to be natural—human dominion—is re-
vealed instead to be manufactured, that is, ideological. Through anthropocen-
trism—the recognition that the only vision is the human vision, the only history
a human history—we can in fact work against anthropocentrism, make it un-
tenable.
In a recent article, Malcolm Bull has suggested a way of  reading Nietzsche
that parallels my reading of  anthropocentrism. Bull argues that the anti-Nietz-
sche is to be found not so much in reading against Nietzsche as in reading be-
yond him by refusing the status of  the Superman, of  the master, which Nietz-
sche “®atteringly offers . . . to anyone” (124). Bull writes, “The act of  reading
always engages the emotions of  readers, and to a large degree the success of  any
text (or act of  reading) depends upon a reader’s sympathetic involvement. A
signi¤cant part of  that involvement comes from the reader’s identi¤cation with
individuals or types within the story” (126–27). Within the work of  Nietzsche,
Bull argues, this identi¤cation is with the Superman: we inevitably “read for
victory,” and this means that Nietzsche is never canceled. Rather, he is demon-
strated. “Reading Nietzsche successfully means reading for victory, reading so
that we identify ourselves with the goals of  the author. In so unscrupulously
seeking for ourselves the rewards of  the text we become exemplars of  the un-
inhibited will to power” (128). We are not being ®attered when Nietzsche ad-
dresses his readers as Supermen: “If  [they] have mastered his text, [readers]
have demonstrated just those qualities of  ruthlessness and ambition that qual-
ify them to be ‘masters of  the earth’” (128–29). Bull argues that the only counter
to Nietzsche is to “read like a loser,” that is, to align oneself  with the herd and
not the Superman. In accepting the argument of  the text, but turning it against
14 Erica Fudge
him/herself, readers will be made to feel “powerless and vulnerable,” and it is
this that will allow them to move beyond the position of  mastery that appears
to be theirs (130).
Bull argues that the vulnerability experienced when reading like a loser rep-
licates interspeci¤c relations: “Superman is to man, as man is to animal” (133).
By refusing to be positioned as Supermen we are inevitably positioning our-
selves as animals, and this, for Bull, is a step forward. It is a step beyond Nietz-
sche rather than a refusal of  him: a refusal, he writes, would allow for the con-
tinuation of  “the position he chose for himself.” An opposition that “comes only
from within pre-existing traditions” would allow Nietzsche to “live for ever as
[his critics’] eschatological nemesis” (123–24).
I am arguing that a similar maneuver is needed within the discipline of  his-
tory. Where Bull posits the anti-Nietzsche, I am suggesting the anti-humanist.
We must abandon the status of  the human as it is presented within humanist
history; we must read against this. Instead, we need to assert and assess the ways
in which “human” is always a category of  difference, not substance: the ways
“human” always relies upon “animal” for its meaning. By refusing humanism,
and, implicitly, anthropocentrism, we place ourselves next to the animals, rather
than as the users of  the animals, and this opens up a new way of  imagining the
past, something that has to be central to the project. If  it is to impact upon ques-
tions about the ways in which we treat animals today, if  it is to have something
to add to debates about factory farming, cruel sports, fur farms, vivisection, and
the numerous other abuses of  animals in our cultures, then the history of  ani-
mals cannot just tell us what has been, what humans thought in the past; it must
intervene, make us think again about our past and, most importantly, about
ourselves. The history of  animals can only work at the expense of  the human.
But this is not to say that the fragmentation of  the human—its lack of  ¤xity—
is the way forward. Rather, I want to suggest that by recognizing the lack of
foundation for our perceived stability we can begin to think about the category
“human” in very different terms. History and humanity are, as the humanists
proclaim, coterminous, but a history can be written that does not celebrate the
stability of  what was, what is, and what shall be. Instead history should reinter-
pret the documents of  the past in order to offer a new idea of  the human. No
longer separate, in splendid isolation, humans must be shown to be embedded
within and reliant upon the natural order.
Wendy Wheeler has discussed the need for change in our political, emo-
tional, and working lives, and her ideas are useful here. She writes of  a moder-
nity in which melancholia, which is “characterized by punitive and vicious self-
loathing, and by an inability to let go and move on,” is the organizing principle
of our world, and she argues for a new modernity in which mourning—which
allows the individual to “transform the shattered fragments of  an earlier self
and world, and to build something new from those fragments and ruins”—will
be the key (165). Using developments in neurobiology, Wheeler claims that this
change from melancholy to mourning is based on the decline of  the “old car-
tesian divide,” a decline which will give way to “more complex holistic models
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of both the individual’s understanding of  the relationship between mind and
body and, more widely, the relationship between individual creatures and the
living world of  which they are a living part.” This Wheeler terms an “ecological
sensibility” (165).
Likewise, we must write a history which refuses the absolute separation of
the species; refuses that which is the silent assumption of  humanist history. By
rethinking our past—reading it for the animals as well as the humans—we can
begin a process that will only come to fruition when the meaning of  “human”
is no longer understood in opposition to “animal.” Then “human” can be recog-
nized as meaning something quite new: a being which only differentiates itself
by being able to write and interpret its own history. If  this is so, it is only right
that we should ensure that this history is the one we deserve.
In his spoof article Charles Phineas likened the need for the history of  pets
to the need for the history of  the left-handed. This connection between the hu-
man “other” and the animal is not a new one, but his connection has a pleasing
resonance with a statement by Walter Benjamin. In “One Way Street” Benjamin
wrote, “All the decisive blows are struck left-handed” (65). From the most un-
expected place comes the most disruptive assault. The history of  animals has
the potential to be such a left-handed blow to many of  the anthropocentric as-
sumptions we have about ourselves. And by this means it can become, I think,
a powerful part of  our revisioning of  our place in the world.
Notes
I am grateful to Clare Palmer, Wendy Wheeler, and Sue Wiseman for reading and
commenting on an earlier draft of  this essay.
1. I am extremely grateful to Anne Goldgar for pointing out this article to me.
While researching this paper I contacted the editor of  the Journal of Social
History in an attempt to discover the status of  the article, but unfortunately,
the journal had no record of  Charles Phineas nor of  the nature of  his article.
However, the previous issue of  the Journal did contain a spoof article—Diana
Shroud, “The Neolithic Revolution: An Analogical Overview.” This spoof was
acknowledged in an “Editor’s Note” in the same number in which Phineas’s
article appeared (368). So spoo¤ng as a way of  raising some interesting histo-
riographical issues was certainly a part of  the work of  the Journal at the time
Phineas’s article appeared.
2. Peter Burke, writing in 1992, seems to have recognized the emerging reality
of  this turn to nature within history when he noted, “Today, the very identity
of  economic history is threatened by a takeover bid from a youthful but ambi-
tious enterprise . . . eco-history” (“Overture,” 1).
3. The pet might be considered an important exception, and much has been
written on its place in culture (see, for example, Shell).
4. This is not, of  course, the only way in which medieval scholars have inter-
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preted their period. In her own monograph, The Beast Within, for example,
Salisbury brings the material and the intellectual positions together brilliantly.
5. In this book Malcolmson and Mastoris do look at the ways in which pigs
served a symbolic function in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth cen-
turies, but the positioning of  the chapter “Images of  the Pig” at the beginning
of the book emphasizes the authors’ concentration in the rest of  the study on
the real, lived relation of  humans and pigs in English culture. The symbolic
animal serves as a lead-in to the real subject of  the book, the real animal.
6. This phrase is an adaptation of  Christian Meier’s call for an increased “inter-
cultural competence” in European history (34).
7. This anthropocentrism of  the animal welfare movement did not end in the
nineteenth century. Ted Benton and Simon Redfearn found that some of
those involved in the Brightlingsea protests against the live export of  veal
calves were just as, if  not more, interested in their own liberty—their right to
protest (51–58).
8. I am indebted to Poster’s analysis in the following pages.
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